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The Economic Background
General Development
THE years 1871 to 1945 encompass a dramatic history—the rise and fall
of the German Empire. At the beginning of this period Germany was a
newly industrialized, enterprising young nation, embarking on a career of
economic and political expansion. Toward the end, a mature German
economy was rallying its resources for the conquest of Europe. And by
1945, a defeated Germany emerged from this venture with a reduced and
crippled population, with destroyed, outworn, or dismantled industry,
with its political and economic unity lost. Between the birth and the death
of the Reich were seventy-five turbulent years.
Although the primary concern in this study is with wages, we must
begin with a background sketch of the major changes in the national
economy and in the labor market. Let us first take note of the important
shifts in the area and the population of Germany, particularly during the
latter part of the period under observation.
AREA AND POPULATION
In the early years, between 1871 and 1913, there was one insignificant
change in area: the little North Sea island of Heligoland was incorporated
into the Reich. But after the defeat of Germany in World War I its
geographic scope was reduced several times, resulting in a territorial loss
of 13 percent and a population loss of 10 percent, or about 6.5 million
people.' Among the areas ceded in accordance with the Treaty of Ver-
sailles were Alsace-Lorraine and parts of Upper Silesia, the province of
Posen, and large parts of western and eastern Prussia. The Saar, with its
important coal mines, was to be administered by France until 1935, when
a plebiscite was to be held. After 1922 there was an interlude of twelve
years during which there were no further shifts of German territory.
But following Hitler's rise to power, the Saar was reincorporated into the
Reich in 1935. Then came a series of annexations by the National Socialist
regime: in 1938 Austria and the Sudetenland; in 1939 the Memel area,
Danzig, and the Wartegau. These acquisitions expanded the Reich's
territory by 45 percent and increased its population by 30 percent, or
more than 20 million.2 With the launching of World War II, a new wave
of annexations resulted in the addition of Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg,
parts of Yugoslavia, and a few other areas. Toward the end of the war even
distant areas such as the North Italian provinces of Trento and Boizano
1StagistischesJahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (hereafter cited as Jahrbuch) 1928,
p. 28.
2Computedfrom data in Jahrbuch 1939-40, page a.
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also were taken into the Reich.3 Other territories, parts of Poland and
Czechoslovakia, were administered by Germany but were never officially
incorporated. There are few industrial nations with a similar record of
territorial contraction and expansion during a brief quarter century.4
Such, in is the recent record of the shifts in land area and in the
population of Germany.5 It is a record that bears heavily upon German
economic development, since the losses and gains quite naturally affected
the relative position of that country as an industrial power. Moreover,
they influenced the structure of the German economy.
The present study is concerned only with the German territory and
population encompassed by the Kaiserreich from 1871 to 1918, and later
with the Weimar Republic and the unexpanded Third Reich (with the
exclusion or inclusion of the Saar). No attempt will be made to present
data for the areas incorporated into the Reich under National Socialism,
except in the few cases where data for "Germany proper" are not available.
Major population changes in the German Reich are shown in Table 1.
Population within the shifting Reich boundaries (column 1) more than
doubled between 1871 and 1945, increasing between 1871 and 1913 by
26 million, and between 1913 and 1945 by 22 million. However, while
population growth before World War I was largely independent of area
changes, after 1913 it was deeply affected by such changes. The table
indicates also that the reduction in the "current Reich area" population
between 1913 and 1929 occurred despite natural population growth.
Obviously too, the greater portion of the increase in "current area"
population between 1929 and 1945 was due to territorial expansion under
the National Socialist regime. Population growth within constant territory
tended to slow down.
NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCTION
A comprehensive picture of Germany's economic development is pro-
vided by the course of national income expressed in marks of constant
The problem of a changing Reich area did not exist during World War I. At that
time occupied territories were put under German administration but were not incor-
porated into the Reich.
After World War II, frontier adjustments and partitioning brought still more
extensive changes. The conquered areas were freed, Austria was declared independent,
Germany east of the rivers Oder and Neisse was brought mainly under Polish adminis-
tration (a small part was annexed by Russia). In 1946, the remaining territory was about
one quarter smaller than the Reich before the war, excluding Austria. The population
loss was less serious since most Germans in the area under Polish administration
migrated west. In 1949, the reduced rump area of Germany, once divided into four
zones of occupation, was transformed into the western Bundesrepublik, and the eastern
Deutsche Demokratische Republik, under Communist administration. In 1950 West
Germany accounted for about three-fourths of the area and population of the two
republics. (See Statistisches Jahrbuc/z für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1953, pp. 13,
21, 31, and 561).
German statistics are far from uniform in the treatment of these changes. They
refer sometimes to a constant Reich area of given (but not always the same) dimension,
sometimes to a changing Reich area. The reader must thereforetake note of the territorial
coverage of any economic measures dealing with the period 1913-45.16 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE 1









1871 41.0 — —
1890 49.2 — —
1913 67.0 59.6 60.4
1929 64.0 64.7
1939 79.5 — 69.3
1945 88.6k' — 67.0
a ExcludesSaar.
bIncludesSaar.
CEstimatedfor 1945. Population of Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxemburg (during their
census years of 1935 or 1936) was added to the 1940 Reich total as given in Jahrbuch
1939-40, P. 9. The rate of population change 1940-45, as experienced in the Reich area
of December 31, 1937, is applied to the result.
SOURCE, by column:
(1) Jahrbuch 1939-40, p. 9.
(2) "Das deutsche Volkseinkommen vor und nach dem Kriege,"
zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, No. 24 (Berlin 1932), p. 66.
purchasing power. According to Table 2, real national income more than
tripled from 1871 to 1913 in the Kaiserreich area; thereafter, from 1913
to 1939, it increased by 50 percent.6 On a constant area basis this would
mean a more than fivefold gain over the whole period 1871 to 1939.
The figure for 1939 is by far the highest during the post-1913 era; un-
doubtedly it reflects the incorporation of the Saar (1935) as well as pre-
parations for war. By contrast, in 1929 one of the best years of the interwar
period prior to the rearmament boom, real national income stood at only
8 percent above 1913 levels. For the "normal" years 1925-32 (post-
inflation, pre-Nazi) it averaged 99 percent of 1913, and for all the interwar
years 1925 through 1939 for which figures are available, it averaged 7
percent above 1913. These averages certainly do not indicate a continu-
ation of the economic growth of the Kaiserreich period. They raise the
question whether after World War I the German economy ceased to be
a progressive economy and just maintained itself as a going, but not a
growing, concern. Before we look for answers to this question, it will be
useful to consider as additional evidence the index numbers of industrial
production presented in Table 2 and Appendix Table A-I.
The production indexes of the Institut für Konjunkturforschung7
are given in Table 2 for selected single years and are averaged for certain
periods. They cover manufacturing, mining, and building construction.
6Theaverage annual rate of increase was 3.1 percent from 1871 to 1913 and 1.6
percent from 1913 to 1939.
Hereafter referred to as IKF.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND /7
TABLE 2













Year REICH AREA OF 1913
1871 28 16 35 21
1890 63 35 56 40
1913 100 100 100 100
REICH AREA OF 1925a
1913 100 100 100 100
1925 94 89 101 92
1929 108 118 109 114
1932 82 53 86 66
1939 150 164bc 128bd l48bC
Average for period:
1925-29 103 103 104 103
1925-32 99 92 101 95
1925-39 107 106 105 105
1919-39° 103 n.a. n.a. 93
n.a. =notavailable.




eDatafor 1919-22 do not apply strictly to 1925 area, since production of ceded areas
was included before their cession.
SOURCE, by column:
(1) Paul Jostock, "The Long-Term Growth of National Income in Germany,"
Income and Wealth (International Association for Research in Income and Wealth,
Series v, 1953), p. 118. Year 1871, linear interpolation between 1870 and 1877.
(2 and 3) 1871-1928,KonjunkturstatistischesHandbuch 1936 (Berlin), Institut für
Konjunkturforschung), p. 47.Hereafter referred to as IKF Handbuch. For 1928-39,
League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1939-40, p. 169 (postwar series spliced in 1928).
Shifted to base 1913 =100.The 1913 data for Reich area of 1925, Sonderheft des Inst it uts
für Kon/unkturforschung (Berlin, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, 1935), No. 31, p. 37.
Hereafter referred to as IKF Sonderheft.
(4) 1871-1929, IKFSonderheftNo, 31, pp. 28, 56, and 58. For 1928-38, Jahrbuch
1939-40, p. 57 (spliced to earlier series in 1928). For 1939, League of Nations, Statistical
Yearbook1939-40,p. 169. Shifted to base 1913 =100.The 1913 data for Reich area of
1925 obtained by averaging cols. 2 and 3. For weights see IKFSonderheftNo.31, p. 37.
On a constant area basis, that is, after adjustment for the area changes
from 1919 to 1922, total industrial production grew about sevenfold
between 1871 and 1939. Such measures of growth are of course very18 WAGESINGERhIANY
sensitive to small differences in the estimates for the base period. More-
over, the 1939 production figure happens to be somewhat more affected
by the territorial acquisitions of the National Socialists than the real
income figure.8 Germany's rapid industrialization around the turn of the
century is reflected vividly in the rise of this index. During this period,
substitution of manufactured for home-produced goods accounts, among
other things, for the greater increase in industrial production—where
these changes are more concentrated—as compared with real national
income. The rapid industrialization process is illustrated further by the
growth of producers' as compared with consumers' goods. According to
the index, producers' goods output increased tenfold from 1871 to 1939;
consumeis' goods output less than fourfold.
With regard to comparative trends before and after World War I, the
production figures bear out the major conclusions derived from the data
on real income. Whereas from 1871 to 1913 increases in production levels
were extremely rapid (fivefold for total production and more than sixfold
for producers' goods), the increases were much more moderate from 1913
to 1939 (48 percent in total production and 64 percent in producers' goods).
Average industrial production during 1925-29 was 3 percent above 1913
levels, during 1925-32 about 5percentbelow 1913, and during 1925-39
about 5percentabove 1913—findings which are all in close agreement
with the national income data. For total production the average level
can be computed for all the years 1919 through The figures indi-
cate that for the interwar period as a whole, industrial production was 7
percent below 1913 levels. We may fairly conclude, then, that Germany's
economic growth during the Kaiserreich prior to 1913 did not continue
at a comparable rate thereafter. The prewar period was clearly marked by
growth. The interwar period, compared to 1913 levels, was not.
The conclusion that economic growth in the interwar period was of
minor significance may seem to contradict data on German production
trends during the period 19 19-39. Table 3 and Chart 1 do indeed show that
a growth trend through these data may rival pre-1913 growth rates. But
closer examination reveals that the rapid increase is attributable mainly
to two unusual circumstances: the extremely low production levels after
World War 1,10 and the rearmament boom from 1936 to 1939. In fact,
production did not reach the 1913 level until 1927. Despite the many
8SeeTable 2, footnotes a and b.
This average has a known upward bias because it includes, for 1919-22, the pro-
duction of subsequently ceded areas. Similarly, Saar production and at least part of
Austrian and Sudeten production are included in some of the years at the end of the
period.
10Themovements from 1919 to 1923 are affected by many abnormal events, including
the demobilization crisis of 1919. They are said to refer to "current Reich area," that
is, they reflect cessions of territory between 1919 and 1922. The effect of these cessions is
counteracted in part by industry migration from the ceded areas to the Reich (from
Lorraine to the Ruhr area, for instance). The early data are affected further by the
inflation and the Ruhr occupation of 1923.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 19
CHART I
Industrial Production, Germany and Other Countries, 1870—1939
abnormal elements in the German development, production trends in the
German economy parallel closely the figures selected by the IKF to
represent "world" production.11 Thus, as concerns the rate of production
growth, Germany's production trends resemble quite closely those of the
large sample of nations chosen by the IKF to represent the "world."
It is in the level relative to 1913 that the striking differences are to be
observed. While world production averaged 25 percent above 1913 during
1919-39, German production was 7 percent below 1913 on a constant
area basis, and 15 percent below the 1913 production of the Kaiserreich
area.
Let us now look at the changes in income and production, as measured
"For countries included in "world" figures and for separate data on United States
and Great Britain, see Table 3.
Source: Table 320 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE3
IndustrialProduction, Germany and Other Countries, Selected Years,
1870-1913; and All Years, 1919-1939
(1913 =100)
United Great
Year States Britain "World"
1913 AREA 9 countries
1870 18 13 43 19
1880 25 21 54 26
1890 40 36 66 43
1900 65 52 77 60
1910 89 85 87 88





1919 38 42 112 89 88
1920 55 61 122 91 96
1921 66 73 98 57 81
1922 71 78 126 78 99
1923 47 52 141 85 107
1924 70 77 134 91 111
1925 83 92 151 89 120
1926 79 87 160 76 123
1927 100 110 160 100 130
1928 102 113 168 98 136
1929 103 114 184 106 146
1930 90 99 157 99 130
1931 74 82 132 91 114
1932 60 66 99 91 101
1933 67 74 115 97 113
1934 85 94 127 110 124
1935 97 107 152 114 140
1936 108 119 178 123 160
1937 119 131 199 131 172
1938 127 140 149 117 161
1939 189 — 166C
ForGermany, manufacturing, mining, and construction; for Great Britain, manu-
facturing and mining; for the United States, manufacturing only.




Germany: See source for Table 2, col. 4. The 1919-22 data include production of
ceded areas before their cession.
United States:1870-99, Edwin Frickey, Production in the United States, .1860-1914
(Harvard Economic Studies, Volume LXXXII, 1947,) p. 54.(Spliced to later series in
1899.) For 1899-1939, Solomon Fabricant, Employment in Manufacturing, 1899-1 939
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1942), p. 331.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 2!
GreatBritain:Waither Hoffmann, "EmIndex der industriellen Production für
Grossbritannien seit dem 18.Jahrhundert," Weltwirtschaftliches A rchiv, Sept. 1934;
and Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, Vol. 63.
World: 1870-1928, IKFSonderheft No. 31, pp. 28 and 56. For 1928-39, Statistik des
In- undAuslands (Berlin,Institut für Konjunkturforschung), passim. Hereafter referred
to as IKF StatistikdesIn-und Auslands. Years1930 and 1931 interpolated on the
basis of unrevised 1929-32 data from IKF Handbuch 1936, p. 46.(Spliced to earlier
series in 1928.) All data shifted to base 1913 =100.
For 1870-1913 the countries included are Belgium, France, Great Britain, Russia,
United States, Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Canada.
For 1919-39, the series covers 38 countries which, according to the IKF, account for
92 percent of world production.
on a per capita basis. Since population increased throughout the period,
albeit at a diminishing rate, the per capita income and production figures
must be expected to exhibit more moderate long-term growth than the
totals. Table 4 shows that between 1871 and 1939 per capita real income
increased about three times, and per capita industrial production three
and a half times, whereas per capita consumers' goods production merely
doubled. Comparison of the growth before and after World War I
demonstrates again the greater contribution of the earlier period to the
over-all development. Averages for the period 1925-32 are 6 to 11 percent
below 1913 levels and averages for the period 1925-39 are 3 to 5percent
below. These trends are significant with respect to wages. Slow growth
in consumers' goods obviously sets limits to real wages. Similarly, a halt in
the rise of per capita production and income must affect wage levels.
During the early sharp rise in over-all per capita real income, real earnings
of wage earners could readily double alongside similar income increases
of other social groups. Between 1913 and the interwar period, the situ-
ation was radically different; over-all per capita real income dropped.
Under these circumstances, even maintenance of 1913 levels of average
earnings for wage earners could have been accomplished only at the cost
of a substantial reduction in the average real income of other population
groups.
We may compare these trends with those prevailing in other industrial
countries. Table 5containsa summary of trends in real per capita national
income for Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. The data show
that the over-all increase in per capita real income between 1871 and 1939
was almost the same for Germany and Great Britain—roughly two and
one-half times. During this period real per capita income in the United
States almost quadrupled. Similar relationships are found for the move-
ments prior to 1913. Between 1871 and 1913, German and British real
per capita income just about doubled while that in the United States
tripled. Between 1913 and 1939, income in all three countries showed
increases of the same order—in Germany, 28 percent, in Great Britain,
31 percent, and in the United States 33 percent—and in all three the
increases are less rapid than for the period 1871-1913 as a whole.12
12TheGerman figure for 1939 includes the Saar.22 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE 4













1871 46 34 57
1890 86 54 76
1913 100 100 100
REICH AREAOF1925b
1913 100 100 100
1924 — 74 92
1925 90 88 96
1926 92 82 82
1927 99 104 104
1928 102 106 104
1929 101 106 101
1930 97 92 97
1931 85 76 92
1932 75 61 79
1933 79 68 84
1934 87 85 94
1935 93 95 90
1936 101 105 96
1937 109 115 100
1938 120 122 103
1939 128 127Cd
Averages
1925-32 93 89 94
1925-39 97 95cd 95cd
a National real income divided by population.
b 1935 on, including Saar.
CIncludesAustria and Sudetenland for 1939.
d First six months of 1939.
souRcE: Income and production data, see source to Table 2.Population data, see
source to Table 1.
1938 and 1939 are not directly comparable. Production data include "as a rule
Austria since the middle of 1938 and Sudetenland since January 1939" (League of
Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1939-40, p. 169). Population data, however, are without
Austria or Sudetenland.
However, great differences do emerge if averages for the interwar period
are compared with 1913 levels. During the period 1925-32, German real
per capita income was 7 percent below that of 1913, British income was
7 percent higher, and United States income 26 percent higher than beforeTHE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 23
TABLE 5
Real National Income per Capita in Germany, Great Britain, and the










1871 46 54 35
1890 86 83 69
1913 100 100 100
Reichareaof 1925Excluding Southern
Irelanda
1913 100 . -. 100
1929 101 112 144
1932 75 107 90
1939 128b 131C 133
Average
for Period
1925-32 93 107 126
1925-39 97d 113 121
a Notethat the basic real per capita income figures for the years after World War I
refer to the current area of Great Britain (excluding Southern Ireland) but that the
index base consists of the prewar per capita income of Great Britain as it existed in
1913 (including Southern Ireland). Prewar per capita income of the new area is not
available.
b Includes Saar territory.
CEstimated,based on Prest and price deflator; our estimate.
d Includes Saar territory from 1935 on.
SOURCE, by column:
(1) Table 4.
(2) A. R. Prest, "National Income of the United Kingdom, 1870-1946," Economic
Journal, 1948, pp. 55 and 58.Shifted to "factor payment" concept based on Jeifries'
adjustment of money income; see James B. Jeifries and Dorothy Walters, "National
Income of the United Kingdom, 1870-1952," Report to the International Association
for Research in Income and Wealth (preliminary).
(3) From Simon Kuznets' worksheets, prepared for Capital Requirements Study,
February 18, 1952 (unpublished).
World War I. For the longer period 1925-39, German real per capita
income was3percent below 1913, while British income and United States
income respectively were 13 and 21 percent above. Although certain
allowances must be made for differences in concepts, character of basic
data, and estimating techniques used in the income computations for the
three countries, it seems clear that German real per capita income levels
during the interwar period not only were low in comparison with Germany's
own 1913 status, but also showed a less favorable development than those24 WAGES IN GERMANY
of Great Britain and, more strikingly, those of the United States. Com-
parison of the three countries in this respect serves further to emphasize
the significance of the break in pre-1913 growth trends for the later develop-
ment of the German economy.
Labor Force: Structure and Organization
CHANGES IN THELABORFORCE
For the purposes of the present study, description of general economic
trends requires an account of the major changes in the labor market.
We shall begin with the German labor force, restricting attention at this
point to the broadest trends. Data for the entire period 1871-1945 are
not available but information does exist for the census years 1882, 1895,
1907, 1925, 1933, and 1939. Between 1882 and 1939, population in the
Reich area (as of 1937) increased from about 40 million to about 69
million—a gain of 70 percent. Members of the labor force during the same
period increased from 17 million to 35 million—a rise of more than 100
percent.'3 The more rapid growth of the labor force in relation to the
population as a whole (Table 6) is attributable in the main to two factors:
the changing age structure of the population14 and the increase in the
number of female workers. Age groups capable of active work outstripped
total population in rate of growth, approximating the growth of the entire
labor force. Women in the labor force accounted for only a quarter of the
female population in. 1882 and 1895 but for more than a third after World
War I.
The changing industrial composition of the German labor force may
be traced in Table 7. Germany in 1882 was still largely agricultural;
farming accounted for 7 out of 17 million gainfully occupied in that year.
Industry (manufacturing, mining, building, and crafts) took up only 6
million members of the labor force. The remaining 4 million were in
trade and services. Between 1882 and 1939, Germany's agricultural
workers increased by one-fourth, but all other major groups of the labor
force except domestic servants swelled more rapidly. It is not surprising
that the number of industrial workers should have increased almost two
and one-half times, since the country was undergoing rapid industrializ-
ation during that period. In percentage terms, however, the rise in industrial
employment was far surpassed by employment rises in public and private
services (up 263 percent) and in trade, transportation, and communications
(up 325 percent). These developments led to major changes in the industrial
composition of the labor force.
The most striking change was the drastic decline in the relative impor-
tance of agriculture. In 1882 about 42 percent of the labor force depended
13Laborforce data in this section refer to the Reich area of 1937, which includes the
Saar.
'4Statistisches Reichsamt, Deutsche Wirrschaftskunde,1933,pp.40-44.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 25
TABLE6










1882 17.0 40.2 42.3
1895 19.9 46.4 42.9
1907 25.4 55.6 45.7
1925 32.3 63.2 51.1
1933 32.6 66.0 49.4
1939 34.6 69.3 49.9
MALE
1882 12.0 19.7 60.9
1895 14.0 22.8 61.4
1907 16.9 27.4 61.7
1925 20.7 30.6 67.6
1933 21.0 32.1 65.4
1939 21.8 33.9 64.3
FEMALE
1882 5.0 20.5 24.4
1895 5.9 23.6 25.0
1907 8.5 28.2 30.1
1925 11.6 32,6 35.6
1933 11.6 33.9 34.2
1939 12.8 35.4 36.2
For Reich area of December 31, 1937 (includes Saar); census classification of 1933,
except for 1939.
souRcE:1882-1933,Jaiirbuch 1939-40, p. 29. For 1939,Wirtschaftund Statistik, 1941,
Sonderbeilagezu Heft 19.
on agricultural pursuits, but by 1939 the comparable figure was only 26
percent. The relative position of the industrial labor force increased but
moderately—from 36 percent in 1882 to 42 percent in 1939, despite the
fervid industrialization of Germany during that period. The apparent
discrepancy is explained by productivity. A great change occurred in
relative importance of employment in the trade, transportation, and
communications group, which rose from 8 percent in 1882 to 18 percent
in 1939, largely because of the development of a national market and the
increasing dependence on manufactured goods. Public and private services
also claimed a larger proportion of the working force. The marked
increase that occurred in this category during the latter census years
represents the growing importance of the Nazi government's control
functions, and its expansion of military and quasi-military forces. The
decline in relative importance of domestic services was undoubtedly a26 WAGESiN GERMANY
TABLE 7















6,050 1,427 991 1,364 17,005
1895 7,218 7,744 2,122 1,385 1,440 19,909
1907 8,597 10,118 3,464 1,726 1,473 25,378
1925 9,807 13,667 5,240 2,208 1,407 32,329
1933 9,388 13,235 5,994 2,725 1,280 32,622
1939 8,985 14,603 6,071 3,599 1,358 34,617
INDEXES (1882=100)
1882 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1895 100.6 128.0 148.7 139.8 105,6 117.1
1907 119.9 167.2 242.7 174.2 108.0 149.2
1925 136.7 225.9 367.2 222.8 103.2 190.1
1933 130.9 218.8 420.0 275.0 93.8 191.8
1939 125.3 241.4 425.4 363.2 99.6 203.6
PERCENT OF TOTAL
1882 42.2 35.6 8.4 5.8 8.0 100
1895 36.3 38.9 10.7 6.9 7.2 100
1907 33.9 39.9 13.6 6.8 5.8 100
1925 30.3 42.3 16.2 6.8 4.4 100
1933 28.8 40.6 18.4 8.3 3.9 100
1939 26.0 42.2 17.5 10.4 3.9 100
For Reich area of December 31, 1937 (includes Saar); census classification of 1933,
except for 1939.
souRcE: 1882-1933, Jahrbuch 1939-40, p. 29. For 1939, Wirrschaft und Statistik, 1941
Sonderbeilage zu Heft 19.
result of several tendencies: the development of wider opportunities for
women in other types of employment; the lessening importance of the
German middle classes; the disinclination of women to conform to the
traditional subservience of German domestic workers; and for the years
after 1939, the efforts of the National Socialist regime to channel the
female labor supply into what were regarded as essential occupations.
Also, within manufacturing drastic changes occurred in the industrial
composition of employment. Table 8 contains information on major
structural changes, for selected years between 1882 and 1939. Note the
drastic declines in the relative importance of textiles, clothing, and food,
and the growing role of the metal and chemical industries. During the
period under review, the share of consumers' goods declined from almost










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































correspondingly.'5 This reflects, of course, the process of Germany's
internal industrialization and her growing participation in the world
export of machinery and chemicals.
Let us examine the numerical role of the wage earner in Germany's
growing economy. Table 9 shows that in 1882 wage earners formed about
TABLE 9
















1,692 1,192 8,406 1,356 17,005
1895 4,649 1,804 2,129 9,892 1,434 19,909
1907 4,779 3,799 3,333 12,012 1,457 25,378
1925 5,129 5,477 5,499 14,886 1,339 32,329
1933 5,338 5,354 5,570 15,131 1,229 32,622
1939 4,816 5,676 6,548 16,237 1,340 34,617
INDEXES (1882 =100)
1882 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0
1895 106.7 106.6 178.6 117.7 105.8 117.1
1907 109.6 224.5 279.6 142.9 107.4 149.2
1925 117.7 323.7 461.3 177.1 98.7 190.1
1933 122.5 316.4 467.3 180.0 90.6 191.8
1939 110.5 335.5 549.3 193.2 98.8 203.6
PERCENT OF TOTAL
1882 25.6 10.0 7.0 49.4 8.0 100
1895 23.3 9.1 10.7 49.7 7.2 100
1907 18.8 15.0 13.1 47.3 5.8 100
1925 15.9 16.9 17.0 46.1 4.1 100
1933 16.4 16.4 17.1 46.4 3.7 100
1939 13.9 16.4 18.9 46.9 3.9 lOG
For Reich area of December 31, 1937 (includes Saar); census classification of 1933,
except for 1939.
SOURCE: 1882-1933,Jahrbuch 1939-40, p. 29. For 1939, Wirtschaftund Statistik, 1941,
Sonderbeilagezu Heft 19.
half,and by 1939 a little less than half, of Germany's labor force. This
remarkable stability contrasts both with the rapidly increasing proportion
of salary earners and the decline of self-employed persons and domestic
servants. Wage earners are, of course, found in all major segments of the
economy—agriculture, industry, trade, services, and the like. Industrial
wage earners, with whom this study is primarily concerned, form only a
SinceTable 8 contains also employment in mining, transportation, etc., the share
of producers' goods is not simply the difference between that of consumers' goods and
100 percent.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 29
portion of the larger group. In 1925, for instance, there were about 10
million of them, compared with almost 15 million wage earners in general.
The rate of their increase was quite different from that of wage earners
as a whole. While the number of all wage earners about doubled between
1882 and 1939, those attached to industry more nearly tripled. And while
wage earners at large declined in relative importance during this period,
industrial workers increased their proportion of the labor force from about
a quarter to about a third. The absolute and the relative changes in the
number of industrial workers are set forth in Table 10. It is this group,
TABLE 10




(millions) (millions) Total Labor Force
(1) (2) (3)
1882 17.0 4.1 24.1
1895 19.9 5.6 28.1
1907 25.4 7.8 30.7
1925 32.3 10.5 32.5
1933 32.6 10.1 31.0
1939 34.6 11.2 32.4




(2):1939, Wirtschafr und Sratistik,1941, Sonderbeilage zu Heft 19.For 1933
and 1925, Jahrbuch 1939-40 P. 31. Area and census classification of 1933. For 1907, our
estimate, based on percentage increase between 1907 and 1925, using 1925 area and
1925 census-classification (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, N.F. 402, P. 226). For 1895
and 1882, our estimate, based on percentage increases between 1895-1907 and 1882-95,
using 1907 area and 1907 census classification (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, N. F.
211, p. 76*).
plus a small number of industrial entrepreneurs and managers included in
the "independent" group, that make up the industrial labor market with
which this study is concerned and which will be described further.
ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS
As German industry developed during 1871-1945 the structure of the
labor market underwent profound changes with respect to the organiza-
tion of both sellers and buyers of labor. At the beginning of the period this
market was virtually unorganized, with a few workers' or employers'
associations operating only on a local basis. There were no labor con-
tracts, and the government played an altogether insignificant role. Toward
the end of the period, regulation of the labor market was compulsory and30 WAGES IN GERMANY.
a function of the government. Both workers and employers were members
of the same organization, and wages and working conditions were deter-
mined centrally by an all-powerful totalitarian regime. We shall now trace
the course of this development.
Two years before the formation of the Reich, the Gewerbeordnung
(industry code) of the North German Federation had revoked the anti-
coalition law. Workers in the young Reich of 1871 could not only con-
gregate in Vereinen (clubs) with educational and cultural objectives, as
they had previously done; they could also form organizations for the
explicit purpose of increasing their strength in the labor market—that is,
band together in trade unions. The early 1870's witnessed the creation
of many such organizations—on a local level and within a single occupa-
tion. Characteristically the organizations were founded largely along
ideological lines, by groups as much interested in political or religious
aims as in unionism for its own sake. The German trade unions began at
their very inception as "liberal" or "socialist" or "Christian," distinctions
which continued right up to their destruction by the Hitler regime. One
reason for the development of several unions, each moving along its own
ideological path, was the political backwardness of Germany itself.
Social reforms were urgent issues for all workers, but the schemes for such
reforms varied in their appeal to religious and political groupings. This
differentiation prevented the growth of a unified trade union movement
like that of Great Britain. However, sponsorship of political reforms by
the German unions undoubtedly helped to speed their growth.
Union activitiesin Germany did not begin with the freedoms
proclaimed by the Gewerbeordnung. The various educational, cultural,
social, and insurance associations of workers played a role in wage
demands, strikes, and strike support. In several industries, for example
printing and tobacco products, workers' organizations existed on a national
scale. But only during the late sixties came the first attempts to unite the
local or national organizations of different industries into broad federa-
tions. A Congress held during September 1868 in Berlin, under Lassalle's
auspices, engaged in the organization and coordination of union activities.
In the same year Karl Hirsch, under the auspices of the Fortschrittspartei
(Progressive Party) organized the Hirsch-Dunker Unions. And the
Socialists Liebknecht and Bebel called for and supported the organization
of unions at their party's Congress at Lisenach, in 1869. In the course of
these various attempts, many national unions were founded—some
before and some after the Franco-Prussian War.
The Hirsch-Dunker group, or Deutsche Gewerkvereine, was a central
organization of unions founded in 1869. The membership of the Hirsch-
Dunker Unions was small in the first decade, between 10,000 and 20,000
workers, but it grew to about 100,000 around the turn of the century and
remained near that level until the outbreak of World War I.This
organization was liberal and patriotic—in contrast to the socialist andTHE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 31
internationalist persuasion of the groups that were later to form the Free
Trade Unions. The Hirsch-Dunker Unions sought to cooperate with
employers and to attain betterment of wages and working conditions by
predominantly peaceful means, although in principle strikes were not
ruled out. Their program was modeled largely upon that of the early
British trade unions, with emphasis on economic rather than political
aims.
The most important German union organization was strongly political,
the Sozialistische Gewerkschaften, or Freie Gewerkschaften (Socialist
Trade Unions, or Free Trade Unions). Many of these unions were founded
largely as a result of the activities of the Sozialdemokratische Partei
(Social Democratic Party), which had adopted the development of trade
unions in all industries as a major interest since its founding. Although the
Free Trade Unions were formally independent organizations, they were
always closely linked to the program and leadership of the Social Demo-
cratic Party. Many union leaders were party members; they embraced the
ideologies of the party, including its tenets on the class struggle and its
anticlerical orientation.
Our first estimate of the strength of the Free Trade Unions dates from
1877. In that year total membership was given as 49,000.16Inspite of the
numerical insignificance of the Free Unions and of the Social Democratic
Party in those early years, the rulers of the new Reich regarded them as
sufficiently dangerous to existing institutions and to the central authority
to warrant suppression. Bismarck's Sozialistengesetz (anti-Socialist law)
of 1878 declared the Social Democratic Party illegal and suppressed, in
rapid succession, one after the other of the Socialist Trade Unions. The
law remained in force until 1890. In the years following its enactment
vigorous prosecution threatened to destroy whatever organizational
strength the free unions had built up. Severe and persistent persecution
led to dissolution or isolation of local organizations, imprisonment or
inactivity of union leaders, and demoralization of members.17 However,
during the later years of the law, the development of so-called Fachvereine
(occupational organizations with ostensibly educational aims) served to
maintain the organizational continuity of the Free Unions and to preserve
their aims. Six weeks after revocation of the law in 1890 a union congress
was convoked and the so-called Generalkommission was established as a
national federation and organizational center for the recently legalized
16Originalestimate by Geib, in Pionier, January 26, 1878. Quoted from Karl Zwing,
Gescj,jchte der Deutschen Fre/en Gewerkschaf:en, Gewerkschafts-Archiv BUcherei,
Bd. 5 (Jena, 1926), pp. 52-53.
17Aboutthe effects of the Anti-Socialist Law on the carpenters union see Josef
Schrnole, Die Sozialdemokrarischen Gewerkschaftenin Deuischlandseit demErlasse
desSozialistengeseizes, Zweiter Teil, Erste Abteilung (Jena), 1898. The author describes,
among other things, the effect of the law on wages, working time, and morale. According
to Schmöle, "the hair-raising wage cuts and the increasing working time in 1879 and
1880 were usually accepted without any resistance." (p. 16.)32 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE 11











1891 278 66 344
1892 237 45 282
1893 224 285
1894 246 ... 67 313
1895 259 67 332
1896 329 72 409
1897 412 80 513
1898 494 34a 83 611
1899 580 87 723
1900 680 77a 92 849
1901 678 84 65 827
1902 733 85 103 921
1903 888 91 110 1,089
1904 1,052 108 112 1,272
1905 1,345 188 117 1,650
1906 1,690 247 119 2,056
1907 1,866 274 109 2,249
1908 1,832 265 106 2,203
1909 1,833 271 108 2,212
1910 2,017 295 123 2,435
1911 2,340 341 108 2,789
1912 2,553 345 109 3,007
1913 2,574 343 107 3,024
1914 2,076 283 78 2,437
1915 1,159 176 61 1,396
1916 967 174 58 1,199
1917 1,107 244 79 1,430
1918 1,665 405 114 2,184
1919 5,479 858 190 6,527
1920 7,890 1,077 226 9,193
1921 7,568 986 225 8,779
1922 7,895 1,049 231 9,175
1923 7,138 938 216 8,292
1924 4,618 613a 147 5,378
1925 4,156 158 4,902
1926 3,977 532a 163 4,672
1927 4,150 606a 168 4,924
1928 4,654 647a 169 5,469
1929 4,906 673a 169 5,470
1930 4,822 659& 198 5,679
1931 4,418 181 5,177
aEnd-of-year figures.
SOURCE: M. Bergmann and others, Handbuch der Arbeit, pp. 46-50, 199, 254-57.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 33
unions. The number of workers involved in this effort was about 3 50,000,18
representing a sevenfold increase over the 49,000 estimated Free Trade
Union members as of 1877, the year before the anti-Socialist law was
put into effect.
An attempt to organize workers outside the domain of the socialist
unions was started later by the so-called Christliche Gewerkschaften
(Christian Trade Unions). The foundation of these organizations must
be largely attributed to the animosity of the Free Unions toward the
Church. The Christian Unions were formed around 1900 from several
separateoccupationalorganizations(miners,textileworkers,etc.),
located mainly in the Catholic regions of western Germany. They held their
first congress in 1899 and established a General Secretariat in Cologne
in 1903 under the leadership of Adam Stegerwald. At that time, the
Christian unions had close to 100,000 members. Between 1903 and the
beginning of World War I they more than tripled their membership,
which numbered 343,000 in 1913. The aims of the Christian unions were
rather similar to those of the Hirsch-Dunker organization, except for
their religious slant.
The large-scale expansion of the trade unions and the growth of their
power in the labor market began about two decades before World War
I. Table 11 shows that membership of the three large unions reached a
combined total of more than 1 million in 1903, 2 million in 1906, and 3
million in 1912. The phenomenal growth of the unions during these
years enabled them to become decisive participants in the determination
of wages and working conditions. During the early years of World War I,
union membership dropped sharply—a lossof almost two-thirds.
Induction of workers into the army, loss of a number of the prewar gains
of labor, and disappointment of many members with the position the
unions had taken toward the war must have contributed to the decline.'9
In the latter years of the war, the unions regained some of their importance.
The gradual recovery after 1916 is explained in part by the influx of
female labor into factories and unions. By 1918 union membership had
climbed again, surpassing the 2 million mark.
The immediate postwar period saw the peak of union strength in
Germany. In 1919 the Ailgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaflsbund (ADGB)
was formed as the central organization of the Free Trade Unions, succeed-
ing the Generalkommission. Membership of the Big Three in that year was
more than double the prewar total. Between 1919 and 1923 the German
unions constituted the largest national labor movement in the world,2°
18MaurycyIBergmann and others, Handbuch der Arbeit, Vol. m (Jena, 1931), p. 37.
'°Thecriticism came from two directions. The radical Left resented the Burgfrieden
(national unity) policy of the unions. The extreme Right criticized the union leaders for
their former international orientation and for insufficient enthusiasm toward the
government's war aims.
20SeeLeo Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism (National Bureau of Economic
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witha membership of about 9 million. From 1922 to 1926, however,
union membership declined steadily. The largest losses, of close to 3
million, occurred during 1923-24, reflecting partly the ineffectiveness of
the unions in their attempts to protect real wage standards during the
inflation, their inability to prevent infringement of the eight-hour day,
and their failure to assure acceptable wage. levels during the period of
currency stabilization. The splitting of the Free Trade Unions into a
social-democratic majority and a communist-dominated minority contri-
buted effectively to the weakening of the movement. The low point was
reached in 1926, when the Big Three counted only 4.7 million members.
From 1926 to 1929 there was another rise in union membership, which
increased to 5.7 million but then began to decrease—in rough conformity
with the ups and downs of general business conditions.2' Total union
strength is not to be measured solely by membership in the three large
centralized organizations. Table 12 presents a complete enumeration of
union membership for 1922, 1929, and 1932 as given by the Statistische
Reichsamt. In the three selected years organized manual workers accounted
for about three-fourths of all organized employees, and white-collar
workers for the remaining fourth. Within the organization of wage earners
proper, the Free Trade Unions represented about 80 percent and the Big
Three well over 90 percent of all organized workers. The situation was
different, however, in the case of white-collar workers. In this category,
the free unions took in only some 30 percent, whereas the Big Three had
between 60 and 85percent.The relative strength of the non-Socialist
unions thus should not be judged on the basis of their wage earner
membership alone.
During the Great Depression union strength was reduced. In view of the
limited ability of the unions to protect the interests of their members
effectively in this period, it is surprising that union affiliation held up
as well as it did. Workers' membership in the Big Three declined from 5.8
21 Anindication should be given of the degree of organization reached in the course
of union development. A comparison of workers organized by the three big unions and
total number of wage earners counted in the nearest census year is presented below:
Union Members Workers Percentage
Big Three Census Years Organized in
(000's) (000's) Unions
(1) (2) (3)
1907 2,249 13,311 17
1922 9,175 . 57a
1925 4,902 16,024 31
1929 5,748 ... 36u
°Relatedto 1925 census count. According to the census count of 1933, there were
16,158,000 workers in the comparable Reich area. Substitution of this figure would not
affect the percentage of workers organized.
souRc€: Col. 1is from Table 11; Col. 2 from Handbuch 1928-40, p. 31 (Reich area of
1934).36 WAGESIN GERMANY
million in 1929 to 5.0 million by the end of 1931, and probably somewhat
further in 1932. Membership of white-collar workers in the Big Three
even showed an increase—from 1.3 million in 1929 to 1.5 million in 1932.
A partial explanation of the mildness of the decline of total union member-
ship is that unemployed members could stay in a union, paying no fees
or only token fees; unemployed persons were even accepted as new
members. However, apart from this technical aspect of membership
rules, the sustained loyalty of the workers to their organizations remains
an important fact of the chronicle. Incidentally, even during this severest
of all depressions, the Communists were not successful, to any important
extent, either in splitting the old-time unions or in organizing unions of
their own. And during the period of the Weimar Republic the factory organ-
ization of the National Socialists, NSBO, made scarcely any attempt to
assume union functions or to compete with the organizations then existing.
When the National Socialist regime came to power in January 1933,
one of its early acts was the destruction of the trade unions. A new
organization, the German Labor Front, was formed and declared to
represent all gainfully occupied persons, whether they were employers,
employees,independentcraftsmen,businessmen,orprofessionals.
Practically everyone, except farmers and government employees, was to be
included in the Labor Front. Numerically, the Labor Front grew rapidly
into a tremendous organization. In 1939 it included about 20 million
individual members in Germany proper and an additional 3 million
members in Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig and the western territories
of Poland. To these figures should be added 10 million so-called collective
members—persons in agricultural, professional, and cultural organizations.
The German Labor Front differed from the old unions in composition,
organization, and functions. In the first place, it was not exclusively an
employees' organization. Second, it was not a voluntary, democratically
run association, but a compulsory organization ruled by the represen-
tatives of the National Socialist dictatorship. Third, and most important,
the function of the Labor Front was not to represent employee interests
in the determination of wages and working conditions, but to maintain
tranquillity in the labor market within the framework of National Socialist
institutions. A part of this job was political and economic pacification of
the workers with deviating ideological and organizational traditions.
That this pacification could be successfully attained in a relatively short
time remains one of the sociologically most interesting—albeit disquieting
—proofs of the instability of political attitudes in a modern industrial
society. Finally, the Labor Front amassed a huge fund from contributions
of its members, a fund providing important resources for the Government.
The role of the Labor Front in influencing conditions of work was an
indirect one: it prevented the existence of any kind of labor organization
independent of Nazi control and thus permitted effective realization of
Nazi directives affecting wages and other working conditions.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 37
ORGANIZATIONOF EMPLOYERS22
During the long period 187 1-1945, great changes took place in the develop-
ment of large enterprises; these changes profoundly affected the labor
market. In 1875 there were only 115 industrial establishments employing
more than 1,000 workers; in 1939 there were 1,344. In the latter year
these enterprises constituted less than 1 percent of all business establish-
ments but employed 23 percent of the labor force. In the same year there
were 9,064 establishments that employed more than 200 workers (com-
pared with 1,549 in 1875). These accounted for about 5 percent of all
industrial units, but employed 44 percent of all workers.23 Aside from the
labor market organization brought about by the growing number of
larger firms, we must consider also the effect of organizations formed to
control product markets (cartels, syndicates, etc.), or to influence tariffs,
export policy, taxes, and other measures of interest to business. Although
these groups claimed no direct concern with the labor market, their
organizational ties were not without influence in this sphere.
Certain combinations were formed for the express purpose of furthering
employer interests in the labor market. These associations of employers
were usually created to neutralize or defeat the forces of organized labor.
As early as 1871-73 there sprang up numerous local associations of
employers, usually within the same industry, to deal with workers' demands
for higher wages and shorter hours. After the crash of 1873, employment
declined, prices fell, labor organizations became quiescent, and most of
the associations of employers disappeared. For the next few decades the
few remaining employers' organizations were relatively inactive and
limited to a few trades.
It was a strike of textile workers in Saxony, in the year 1903, that
revived employers' interest in banding together. To combat the solidarity
of the Free Trade Unions, employers in several industries cooperated to
provide support for the textile industrialists. This activity resulted in two
permanent associations of employers, which in 1913 were fused into one,
the Vereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbande (Federation of German
Employers Associations) or VDA, jointly employing about 1.8 million
persons in that year.24
Under the Weimar Republic the VDA was a highly centralized, efficient
22Fora general description of the development and policies of employer organiza-
tions see Adolf Weber, Der Kampf zwisc/zen Kapital und Arbeit (Tubingen, 1954).
A radically critical treatment of the topic is found in Jurgen Kuczynski's Studienzur
Geschichtedes Deutschen Imperialismus(Berlin, 1948), Vol. 1, Chapter 2.
23Forthe 1939 data see Handbuch 1928-44, p. 245. For the 1875 data see Statistik
des deutschen Reichs, No. 35 (Berlin, 1879), p. 853.
24Employerorganizations grew more or less in proportion to union membership.
In 1904, when the three big unions had 1.3 million members, the employers' organiza-
tions covered 1.1 million workers. By 1913, the three unions counted 3.0 million members,
and the employers' association covered 1.8 million workers. In 1920, when the three
unions reported 9.2 million members, the employers' associations covered about 8
million.38 WAGES IN GERMANY
association, consisting of two organizations, one functioning on an in-
dustrial and the other on a regional basis. Depending upon the problem of
the hour, either one of these organizations, or both together, could take
action. A separate corporation, the Deutsche Streik Schutz, provided
strike insurance. Apart from labor market activities proper, VDA also
entered into arrangements with nonindustrial employer associations for
exchange of information and cooperation in legislative efforts and other
matters of common interest. It maintained ties with industrial organiza-
tions like the Rejchsverband der Deutschen Industrie in order to coordinate
actions affecting general economic policy. During the years 1920-32,
VDA and its affiliated associations wielded great power in the labor
market.
The reorganization of German business under the Nazis affected
employer representation in a radical manner. The VDA dissolved shortly
after the destruction of the old trade unions. A law of February 27,
1934, designed to promote an "organic structure of the German Economy,"
gave the Ministry of Economics broad authority to reshuffle trade associa-
tions, extend their membership, and recognize them as exclusive repre-
sentatives of their industry. The leadership principle was to permeate the
functioning of these organizations. In the course of executing this law,
many of the business organizations that had flourished during the
Weimar Republic were incorporated into a new structure of "groups"
and "chambers," without drastic changes in personnel. On the other hand,
their policies were, of course, fitted into the patterns decreed by the Nazi
administration.25 Since,after the abolition of collective bargaining,
wages and working conditions were no longer to be determined by inde-
pendent labor market factors, collective representation of employer
interests was declared obsolete. Ideologically, the separate representation
of employer interests ran counter to the National Socialist tenet that there
were no "class" interests, but only a national interest.
DETERMINATION OF WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS
During the early decades of the Reich, wages and working conditions were
determined largely by the employers, whose prerogatives in this respect
were regarded as property rights flowing from ownership of their establish-
ments. These were the years when the labor market most nearly approached
the state of "perfect competition," so that short-term changes in wages
resulted only from abundance or scarcity of workers at the posted rate.
The Gewerbeordnung (industry code) of the Norddeutsche Bund (North
German Federation) of 1869 permitted coalition in unions, but restricted
this right to industrial workers. It aiso limited the unions' freedom to
recruit and to strike, by invoking penalties where such activities might
be coercive. After the foundation of the Kaiserreich, the Gewerbeordnung
25Onthe organization of business under Nationa' Socialism see Franz Neumann,
Behemoth (Oxford University Press, 1942),pp. 240-47;and L. Hamburger, How Nazi
Germany HasControlledBusiness(BrookingsInstitution, 1943).THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 39
was applied to the whole of Germany. The government tolerated unions
in principle, but in actual cases of labor strife the local police authorities
frequently prevented the workers' organizations from exercising their new
rights. Agitating, organizing, demonstrating, and striking were often
regarded as violations of the law-and-order provisions of the Ailgemeine
Landrecht. Also, unions were frequently closed down when public pro-
secutors started procedures against union leaders for violations of the
old Prussian Vereinsgesetz of 1850—a law plainly superseded by the
Gewerbeordnung.26In spite of these vexations, organizational activity
continued and strikes did occur; they must have affected wages and work-
ing conditions to some degree. On the whole, collective action on the part
of workers was usually local and spontaneous, excçpt in the printing
trades.
Bismarck's anti-Socialist laws (1878-90) established the right of the
police to suppress subversive institutions and publications, and to exile
persons responsible for subversive activities. Originally directed primarily
against Socialists, it led to intense persecution of union leaders and to
the dissolution of unions. Only local, strictly vocational associations were
tolerated. At the same time, however, the state supported legislation
favorable to labor. Thus during the period of the anti-Socialist laws, a
workers' insurance system was built which became a model for other
industrial nations. In 1883 nation-wide sickness insurance was established,
in 1884 accident insurance, in 1889 disability and old age insurance.
However, the government took little positive action on working conditions
and wages. The industry code contained some elementary provisions for
the protection of women and children, and for the inspection of industrial
enterprises to insure minimum standards of hygiene. But there was no
regulation of maximum hours or minimum wages.
The great, era of social legislation for the protection of labor and
the improvement of working conditions started after 1890, under the
leadership of the Prussian Secretary of Commerce, von Berlepsch. In
1891 a far-reaching revision of the Gewerbeordnung was instituted, which
provided for Sunday rest in industry and not more than, five hours'
Sunday work in trade; effectively prohibited the truck system ;27set
minimum standards for the protection of health and maximum hours for
work in certain industries dealing with noxious materials; and established
legal limits to working hours for women and youths. The revised
Gewerbeordnung did not, however, set minimum wages, establish general
maximum hours, or affect the prevailing methods of wage determination.
Toward the turn of the century, union leaders worked toward general
The Vereinsgesetz required registration and supervision of workers organizations;
it forbade extension of organization beyond the local level. In Prussia, all social and
insurance groups were supervised and on occasion prosecuted under this law. Only
in 1900 did federal law specifically permit broader than local organization and legitimate
union activities—notwithstanding existing state law.
27Underthis system part of the workers' remuneration was given in kind.40 WAGESIN GERMANY
acceptance of collective bargaining as a basis for the determination of
wages. Collective agreements were not, at that time, altogether a novelty.
The book printing trades had concluded local wage agreements as early
as the middle of the nineteenth century, and after 1873 had negotiated
nation-wide agreements on wages, hours, and other conditions of work.
Aside from the book printing trades, however, even local collective
agreements were rare; none are reported until the late 1880's.28 Collective
bargaining and conclusion of union contracts became increasingly im-
portant after 1900; by the beginning of 1914 there were in effect about
10,900 contracts covering 1,399,000 workers.29 But even with the multipli-
cation of agreements, the German trade unions did not succeed in obtain-
ing legal recognition of their role as representatives of labor in collective
bargaining up to the outbreak of World War I.
The war led to increased state activities in the field of labor relations.
These were not always to the advantage of labor. For example, protection
of women and children in industrial plants tended to be ignored, and
general compulsory labor for men was introduced in 1916 by the
Ailgemeine Dienstpflicht Gesetz (Auxiliary Service Law). At the same time
the importance of labor's cooperation in the prosecution of the war was
clearly recognized, resulting in increased recognition of the trade unions
as the workers' representatives. Unions were assured that they would
cease to be treated as political organizations, subject to the restrictions
imposed on the latter. In the spring of 1918, a provision affording legal
protection to strike breakers was revoked. During the last months of the
war the attempt to assure labor's cooperation led to the organization of a
central board of employer and employee representatives.
The decisive change in the official status of labor came with the
Revolution of 1918. Though not "radical" with regard to basic changes
in economic institutions, the revolution brought far-reaching political
changes and, at least for a while, did not lack in dynamic impetus. During
several months, radical Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, patterned after
Soviet models, attempted to gain power and threatened both industrialists
and unions. A provisional Socialist government was established to hold
office until the election of a parliament. A few days after the outbreak
of the Revolution, the Provisional Government proclaimed complete
freedom of association, extending this right to farm workers, domestics,
and civil servants. On November 15, 1918—that is, within a week after
the founding of the Republic—the famous Stinnes-Legien Agreement was
concluded and the so-called Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft (Central Board
for Industrial Cooperation) was set up. The agreement, drafted and signed
by representatives of the three major unions and by representatives of
the Federation of Employers' Associations, was of far-reaching importance,
28Fordetails see Robert Kuczynski, Arbeitslohn und Arbeitszeit in Europa und
A,nerika,1870-1909 (Berlin,1913), pp.403, 498, 527, 534, etc.
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for it not only formulated the principles along which labor relations were
to develop during the following decade and a half, but also embodied the
basic compromise upon which the Weimar Republic was founded—the
parity of capital and labor. By the agreement unions were recognized as
the official representatives of labor; wages and working conditions were
to be determined by collective bargaining between employers and union
representatives; arbitration was to be invoked in case of conflict; and work
councils, formed to enforce the provisions of the collective agreements,
were to function in all but the smallest factories.
The Stinnes-Legien Agreement was soon implemented by legislation.
Within two weeks government decrees provided that written collective
agreements were to have the force of legal contracts, in some instances
applying to entire industries. Another decree established techniques of
arbitration, with awards that could be made binding even if they ran
counter to the desires of the conflicting parties. A further decree estab-
lished the 8-hour day.
It was the aim of the Weimar Republic to foster permanent compromises
between capital and labor, mainly through collective bargaining. To this
end labor had to be represented on all levels. Labor representatives were
to participate in a supreme economic advisory board, the Reichswirt-
schaftsrat (Reich Economic Council). Special labor legislation was to
provide the conditions under which the system of collective democracy
could function. Trade unions were to bargain with employers for satis-
factory wages and working conditions in various industries or industry
sections. Only where agreement could not be achieved through direct
negotiation between workers and employers, could government officials
issue binding awards which had the effect of imposed contracts. On
the plant level, the interests of labor were to be represented by Betriebsräte
(works councils) which were to have a large share not only in the establish-
ment and administration of factory rules and in the execution of the
collective agreements, but also in the supervision of the general manage-
ment of production, finances, and the like.30 Representatives of unions
as well as of employers' organizations served as judges in labor courts.31
30Theoriginal concept of the works councils' functions was rather sweeping. Although
some antecedents of works councils had existed in former shop committees, the estab-
lishment of the councils in the early years of the Republic was due largely to radical
demands for the establishment of a German Rätesystem patterned after the Russian
soviets. Alternative schemes for combining the Rätesystem with democratic institutions
were advanced by the non-Communist wing of the German labor movement. As a
compromise between the various factions, a clause was incorporated in the Weimar
Constitution providing for works councils as the lowest level of a structure of joint
economic administration. Near the top of the structure stood the Reichsarbeiterrat
(Reich Labor Council), which in turn would form part of the top Reich Economic
Council. See S. W. Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy (Crowell, 1946), pp. 161-65.
See also Boris Stern, Works Council Movement in Germany, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bul. 383, 1925.
31Fora description of the role of union representatives in German labor courts see
Frieda Wunderlich, German Labor Courts (University of North Carolina Press, 1946).42 WAGES IN GERMANY
Such was the pattern of collective industrial democracy in which capital
and labor were to rule jointly, the function of the state being merely to
act as arbiter.32
In actual fact, however, many of the provisions for such joint rule
remained on paper only. Some of the articles of the Weimar Constitution
concerned with the Ratesystem were not followed by specific laws and thus
never became effective. The Social Democratic support of a national
constituent assembly put an end to any political prospects for the work
councils; the Betriebsrategesetz limited the functions of the work councils
largely to those of ordinary shop committees. The intermediate councils,
designed to be the link between factory organizations and central adminis-
tration, never materialized. The Reich Economic Council did not deter-
mine economic policy, nor did labor participate in the supervision of
management in industrial undertakings. What did work was the collective
bargaining aspects of the plan, at least in times of prosperity, so that for
many years wages were actually determined by free negotiations between
representatives of industry and labor. Table 13 shows that the number of
TABLE 13








Year AgreementsCovered Covered AgreementAgreement
1914 10.9 143 1,399 13 128
1920 11.0 272 5,986 25 544
1924 8.8 813 13,135 92 1,493
1929 8.9 998 12,276 112 1,379
1931 9.1 1,068 11,950 117 1,313
SOURCE: 1914-20, W. Woytinsky, Die Welt in Zahien (Berlin, 1925) Vol. it, p. 153.
For 1924-29, Reichsarbeitsbl alt, Soriderheft 55, p. Fot 1931, Statistisches Reichsamt,
Deutsche Wirtschaftskunde, 1933, p. 299; data for 1931 not strictly comparable with
earlier data.
workers covered by collective agreements jumped from about 1.4 million
at the beginning of 1914) to nearly 6.0 million in 1920, and to 13.1 million
in 1924. They stood at about 12.3 million at the beginning of 1929. The
table shows also that a declining number of agreements tended to cover
an increasing number of establishments and workers. This is a reflection
of the ever-widening scope of collective agreements. While in 1913 almost
half of all agreements covered a local trade or a single establishment, this
32Fora detailed discussion of the subject see Nathan Reich, Labor Relations in
Republican Germany; an Experiment in Industrial Democracy, 1918-1933 (New York,
Oxford University Press, 1938).THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 43
type amounted to only 10 percent of all agreements in 1929. In that year,
90 percent were regional or national in scope—covering a still higher
percentage of workers.33
The mechanism for collective agreements worked tolerably well as
long as the economy ran relatively smoothly, but headed into difficulties
with the Great Depression. In the course of the depression, the conflict
between the basic aim of trade unions (to keep up and improve the workers'
standaids of living) and the desire on the part of employers to reduce
labor costs (in order to maintain or restore profitability) became in-
creasingly sharp. Under such tensions no amount of bargaining could
lead to agreements, especially since union leaders understandably preferred
not to agree voluntarily to wage cuts. The state had then to carry out its
function as arbiter. Now this function had worked out to the advantage
of the trade unions as long as business conditions were good and as long
as the Social Democratic Party participated in the government. in fact,
the unions had become rather dependent on "their" government in the
settlement of When, in March 1930, the Social Democratic
Party left the coalition government, it escaped direct responsibility for
the unpopular deflationary measures, but at the same time deprived the
unions of their most important instrument for influencing economic
policies. As the depression continued, compulsory arbitration became
more and more important, and the decisions, under the changed economic
and political circumstances, tended more and more to reduce labor costs
and to defend profit. Voluntary collective agreements gradually dis-
appeared, and resort was had increasingly to arbitration. Of the 7,541
wage agreements in effect by the end of 1931, about one third had been
achieved through arbitration. These arbitrated agreements covered as
many as 6.6 million of the 8.3 million workers under collective contracts.35
On December 8, 1931, Reich Chancellor Bruning, in his Fourth Emergency
Decree,36 ordered an across-the-board reduction in wage rates to the level
of January 10, 1927, regardless of existing collective agreements. This was
the beginning of wage determination by fiat. Thus wage determination by
agreement was the first victim of the emergency rule which ultimately was
unable to preserve either the economic or the political institutions of the
Republic.
For 1913, see Wiadimir Woytinsky, Die Welt in Zahien (Berlin, 1925), p. 156.
For 1929 see Reichsarbeitsblatt, Sonderheft 55, p.
FriedaWunderlich describes how workers started to lose interest in their unions
when wages were "fixed by the state." See "Labor under German Democracy," Social
Research, 1940. Supplement 11, P. 86.
Jahrbuch 1933, p. 317.
36Article48 of the Weimar Constitution provided for emergency legislation by the
President, in extraordinary circumstances. Theoretically, the Reichstag had the con-
stitutional power to repeal such legislation but made scant use of this right, because of
difficulties in agreeing on substitute measures. The repeated use of the emergency decree
by Brüning led to the serious abridgement of democratic processes. It was widely
regarded as signifying a transition to government by dictatorship.44 WAGES IN GERMANY
It was but a small step from wage setting by compulsory arbitration
and emergency decree to outright administrative determination of wage
levels. When, in 1933: the National Socialists took power they abolished
collective bargaining and fixed minimum wage rates at existing rock-
bottom levels. The National Labor Law of January 20, created
the office of a supreme Reich Labor Trustee. He and his deputies had the
power to determine (collective rules) covering entire
industries, and setting minimum wage rates. The rules permitted individuals
to be paid at higher rates than the established minimum wages—as
under the Weimar Republic. This arrangement worked well enough,
from the government's point of view, as long as unemployment kept wage
rates close to minimum levels. But by the end of 1934 the revived metal-
working industry was beginning to offer rates well above the minimum
and, when the rearmament program got into full swing, industries con-
nected with war production had to raise wages. Thus, in June 1938, the
labor trustees were empowered, at their discretion, to fix wage maxima in
addition to the minima. At the same time, permission had to be obtained
for any adjustment of existing rate schedules. Circumventions of these
provisions were frequent,38 but no new wage measures were introduced
before the outbreak of World War II.
The War Economy Order of September 1939 brought a host of wage
regulations. It required the labor trustees to fix wage maximums for all
sectors of the economy. Premium rates were abolished for overtime, night,
Sunday, and holiday work, and provisions for holidays with pay were
suspended. Special permission had to be obtained for any changes in
rates, and infringement of the new rules was to be punishable by fines,
imprisonment, or forced labor.
Modification of these rules was soon necessary. Before the year 1939
was out, holidays with pay, and higher rates for night, Sunday, holiday,
and overtime work were partially restored.39 In order to control average
hourly and weekly earnings and at the same time to stimulate increased
output, the government also introduced a new system of "efficiency wages."
Workers were classified into eight skill grades for which base rates were
set. According to his output, each worker received an efficiency number
On the destruction of the trade unions and the formation of the Labor Front, see
Hans-Gerd Schumann, Nagionalsozialismus undGewerkschaftsbewegung:Die Vernich-
tungder deutschenGerwerkschaftenund der Aufbau der Deutschen Arbeitsfront,
(Hanoverand Frankfurt a/M, 1958). On the early phase of wage policy under National
Socialism see P. Waelbroeck and I. Bessling, "Some Aspects of German Social Policy
under the National Socialist Regime," International LabourReview, February1941.
38Theyconsisted of upgrading jobs; increasing family allowances; granting special
allowances for housing and traveling; increasing contributions toward insurance,
pension funds, and income taxes. See René Livchen, "War-time Development in German
Wage Policy," Internailonal Labour Review, August 1942, p. 139.
Under the restoration decree overtime payments by the employer began after the
eighth hour, overtime wages for the employee after the tenth hour. The overtime pay-
ments for the ninth and tenth hour went to the government. Full restoration of prewar
conditions took place in September 1940. See ibid., pp. 143 and 146.THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 45
which determined his pay below or above the base rate, but as average
productivity increased, the base rates could be lowered at will by the
government. Thus only earnings differentials, but not necessarily earnings
levels, were affected by increased effort of workers. This system operated
in most of the larger enterprises in the building and metal industries, and
to some extent in the coal mining and textile industries.40 Coupled with
the official determinations of wage rates and the cost of living, the system
of controls set up by the National Socialists represented the most pervasive
power over wages, whether monetary or real, ever effected in modern
German industry.
Trends in Hours of Work
One of the momentous changes in labor conditions during the period under
discussion was the reduction of working hours. Such reductions occurred,
of course, in all major industrial nations, though the German situation
differed in some important respects from that of other countries. Since
Germany was a latecomer to the industrial field, German workers at the
time of the Reich's foundation were still subject to the long hours cus-
tomary in agricultural work and common in early industrialization.
Further, when the eight-hour day was finally established, it came literally
"overnight," as one of the first administrative decrees of the young
Weimar Republic.
Hours are, next to wages, the most important aspect of working con-
ditions. Furthermore, changes in hours have a direct effect upon daily
and weekly earnings; and, through their influence on premium payments
for overtime, night work, and the like, they also affect hourly earnings.
Any discussion of wages, therefore, must take into account the concurrent
changes in daily and weekly working hours. What were the major trends
in hours of work during the period 1871-1945?
In Germany during the early 1870's, the 12-hour day was probably
most frequent, though workdays varied considerably in length. Building
workers in Berlin and printers and cabinetmakers in large cities were
already working under 10-hour maximum arrangements, whereas textile
workers in Silesia worked 14 and 15 hours a day. In many industries,
especially in the smaller communities, the workers had still to win
recognition of the 12-hour day as a maximum.4' The demand for shorter
JohnP. Umbach, "Labor Conditions in Germany," Monthly Labor Review, March
1945, p. 511.
Forthe development of hours, see "Arbeitszeit" in Handwörterbuch der Staats-
wissenschaften, 1923 edition, pp. 896-97; "Arbeitszeit" in Handwörterbuch der Arbeits-
wissenschaft, p. 426; "Geschichtliche Entwicklung des Achtstundentages im In-
und Ausland," in Reichsarbeitsblatt 1919, pp. 386 if. and 456ff.; and Robert Kuczynski,
op.cit.,passim. Estimates of the trend of average hours in large cities, before 1913, are
givenby Paul Jostock, "The Long-term Growth of National Income in Germany,"
Income and Wealth (International Association for Research in Income and Wea1th,
Series v, 1955), p. 99.46 WAGES IN GERMANY
working hours was widespread and an active concern of all workers'
organizations.
During the 1870's and 1880's the movement for -eduction of the working
day continued. In 1877 the newly formed Social Democratic Party sub-
mitted legislation in the Reichstag for a 10-hour maximum day for men
from Monday through Friday and a 9-hour maximum on Saturday.
These proposals fell on deaf ears at the time, but they served to make
the shortening of the working day one of the most popular demands of the
Social Democratic Party and of the labor organizations allied with it.
In subsequent years shorter hours were introduced in a number of indus-
tries, often as a result of strikes. A working day exceeding 11 hours still
prevailed in most factories in 1890 but was regarded by the workers and
their organizations as an important object of reform.
About 1890, efforts to reduce the length of the working day attained
more organized expression.After theFirstInternationalSocialist
Congress in Paris in 1889, the Social Democratic Party of Germany
formally included in its program the demand for an 8-hour day. The
limitations on hours worked by women, contained in the 1891 revision of
the Gewerbeordnung, gave further impetus to the move to reduce hours.
In 1892 a commission for labor statistics was formed—largely for the
purpose of making inquiries into prevailing working hours. The decades
between 1890 and the outbreak of World War I witnessed an appreciable
shortening of the working day. An official inquiry of 1897 found the
working day to be between 9 and 11 hours. Although no average was
stated, it was probably above 10, possible above 1.0k hours. From 1908
on, available statistics report the working hours agreed upon in labor
contracts; the average length of the working day stipulated for 1913,
for example, was somewhat abovehours.42 During World War I
many of the gains of the preceding decades had to be sacrificed to meet
the emergency needs of the Reich. Particularly in munitions plants, and
especially during the latter part of the war, workdays of 11 hours and more
became the rule rather than the exception.
After the German defeat in 1918, one of the first acts of the Weimar
Republic was to legalize the 8-hour day in the decrees of November
2 and December 17, 1918. If working hours were unevenly distributed
over the week the total could not be more than 48 hours; if half-day work
were arranged for Saturdays, the time could be made up on the other
workdays of the week. The decrees, originally designed to govern working
hours during the period of demobilization, were intended as temporary
However, it must be assumed that organized workers covered by labor contracts
commanded better than average working conditions. In 1913 the average day for
German workers was in all likelihood about 10 hours, perhaps a bit longer. A day of
10 to 11 hours is given by the Handwörierbuch der Arbeitswissenschaft, p. 466. JUrgen
Kuczynski assumes "over 10 hours" in Germany, 1800 to the Present Day (Vol. 111,
Part 1, of A ShortHistory of LabourConditionsunderIndustrial Capitalism, London,
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measuresto be replaced eventually by a permanent law. However,
since several government bills introduced in the Reichstag during 1921-23
failed to obtain majority votes, the validity of the demobilization decrees
had to be extended again and again. Although the 8-hour law was quite
specific, the economic stresses of the inflation led to frequent infractions.
Complaints were heard that an economy impoverished by defeat in war
and disorganized by the rapidly declining value of its currency could not
afford to limit its output by a rigid 48-hour maximum.43 Thus the decrees
were allowed to lapse. On December 21, 1923 a new decree, permitting
longer hours in several circumstances, was passed. There is no doubt
that, shortly after its enactment and during the expansion up to the middle
of 1925,the8-hour day or 48-hour week was significantly exceeded,
especially in smaller communities. For the main industrial centers of the
Reich as a whole, the average working time in manufacturing and related
industries during the mid-l920's was nearly 50 hours per week, or 8.3
hours for each of six working days of equal length.
In the course of the next few years the trend was toward shorter hours.
Table 14 shows a decline in collectively agreed "normal" hours per week
from 49.8 in 1924 to 48.8 in 1929. A similar decrease appears also in the
results of inquiries by unions which tried to measure hours actually worked.
During the subsequent depression, average hours of full-time workers
dropped still further with the decline in overtime work. In view of the
large number of unemployed, the unions sought in vain to spread the
available work by obtaining a legal limitation of the week to 40
According to government inquiries beginning with 1929, the average
workweek of employed wage earners amounted in that year to 46 hours.45
Between 1929 and 1932 the average number of weekly hours per wage
earner declined further to 41.5, reflecting the increasing incidence of part-
time work during the Great Depression.46
During the economic expansion under National Socialism, the length
of the working day increased. The official figures on average hours per
week in manufacturing show an increase of about 8 hours between 1932
and 1939. The average for the latter year is 47 hours per week. This would
imply an average workday of less than 8 hours. It must be remembered,
The arguments are given in detail by Robert Kuczynski, Postwar Labor Conditions
in Germany,Bureauof Labor Statistics, Bul. 380, 1925, pp. 104-7. See also his analysis of
further developments, pp. 107-15.
"Jahrbuchdes AilgemeinenDeutschen GewerkschaJ'tsbundes 1931, Berlin, 1932,
p. 158.
"Table 14 shows this to be almost three hours below the normal work week stipu-
lated in labor contracts and the actual hours worked as reported in union statistics.
The explanation lies in the character of the official data. While the total number of
workers carried on the payroll is used as the denominator, the hours counted are only
those actually worked—excluding those lost by sickness, leaves of absence, and at times
even by vacations. Part-time workers and their shorter work week are included in these
statistics, without any adjustments.
"In 1929 part-time workers formed 7 percent of union members; in 1932 more than
24 percent. See IKFHandbuch 1933,p. 29.48 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE 14
Average Working Hours per Week, 1924-1942
NormalHours Implicit in Wage Union











1924 48.9 51.9 49.8 50.4b
1925 48.8 51.3 49.5 ...
1926 48.9 51.4 49.6 ...
1927 48.4 50.8 49.1
1928 48.5 49.8 48.9 48.9d 46.00














a Averages of April and October.
bAverageof one week in May and November.
Average of one week in April and October.
UOneweek in October.
0Lastsix months.




(1, 2) For 1924, computed from data inJahrbuch 1928, p. 371. For 1925-29, computed
from data in Jahrbuch 1930, p. 299. (Slight change in coverage.) Twelve industries.
(3) Weighted average of cols.I and 2.Weights:2.5 (skilled) + I(unskilled),
according to number of workers as given in Viertel/ahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen
Reichs, 1931, p. 97.
(4) Computed from frequency distributions given in Jahrbuch des Ailgemeinen
Deutschen Gewerkschafzsbunds (Berlin, 1930), p. 221. Open-end classes include at
times as many as 20 percent of workers. Mid-points of open-end classes were assumed
to be 1.5 hours distant from specified inner class limits.In upper-end classes this is
reasonable in view of customary limitations on working hours during peacetime. In
lower-end classes, the selection of the probable mid-points is more uncertain, but the
frequencies are small and relatively stable (close to 6 percent throughout except for
1924, where they are about 5 percent).Alternative reasonable assumptions about
probable mid-points have only minor effects on results. Sample size of investigation
varies between 2.4 and 3.1 million workers. Data are for one week in year (seasonally
non-extreme). (notes continue)THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 49
(5) For 1928, estimated from change in average daily working hours 1928-29,
IKF Handbuch 1936, p. 32. Data for 1929-39, Jahrbuch 1939-40, p. 384. Entry for
1942, Monthly Labor Review, March 1945, p. 513.Series covers the manufacturing,
mining, and building activities of the hzdustrieberichterstattung.
however, that the surprisingly low average is brought about by the large-
scale use of part-time workers, especially women, in this period of acute
labor shortage.
The outbreak of World War II brought some extension of working
hours. The increase was not, however, as spectacular as it would have been
if the German economy had not already reached full employment under
the rearmament program. The official statistics report an average work-
week of only 49 hours in 1942—just 2 hours above 1939 levels. Again the
effect of part-time work on these averages must be considered. There is
good evidence that the hours of full-time workers were appreciably higher,
except in certain civilian industries suffering from materials shortages.
In war industries, employees often worked 60 or more hours a week during
1942. Toward the end of the war working hours increased still further.
In 1944 the working time was 60 hours per week or 10 hours per day in
most industries, and reached 72 hours per week or 12 hours per day in
many armament and other factories engaged in war production.47 The
wheel had gone a full circle for the second time. By the end of the war
German workers were putting in about the same length of time as they
had some three decades earlier, during World War I, or seven decades
earlier, at the time of the foundation of the Reich. After the military and
political collapse of 1945, the 8-hour day and the 48-hour week again
became the rule for German workers.48
In the foregoing pages we have scanned those developments in the
German economy that seem essential for an understanding of wage
behavior. We have followed the transition from the Kaiserreich to the
Weimar Republic, with its political crises, and finally to the advent of a
totalitarian regime. In the economic sphere we have traced the growth
of production and national income during the first four decades of Reich
history, the break in growth trends following World War I, the feverish
economic expansion, and the subsequent collapse during the Third Reich.
Reviewing the changes in the labor market, we have noted the increasing
Monthly Labor Review, March 1945, p. 513. The decree on the sixty-hour week of
1944 abolished the former legal limits of weekly hOurs for men, pointing to the super-
human exertion of German soldiers on all fronts. For women and youths, a maximum
workweek of 56 hours was maintained. See Reichsarbeitsblait 1944, Part z, p. 318, and
Part v, p. 327.
48InWestern Germany, the Hours of Work Order of 1938 was still in force at the
time of writing. It prescribes the forty-eight-hour week, with overtime payments for
additional work. Actual working time was reported to be about 40 hours during the
first few postwar years, but closer to 49 or 50 hours in more recent years. See the follow-
ing articles in International Labour Review, "Conditions in Germany, Normal Hours
of Work in the U.S. Zone," July 1948, pp. 101-2; H. C. Nipperday, "The Development
of Labour Law in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1945," August 1954,
pp. 160-61.50 WAGESIN GERMANY
importance of industrial wage earners and the trend toward ever tighter
organization of the labor market. Finally, we have observed the trend
toward shorter working hours, and the fluctuations in hours under varying
business conditions and during the several crises through which Germany
passed. Against this general background let us now proceed to the primary
subject of this book, the analysis of wage behavior.